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Expressivism is not a view about how we should talk about moralmatters.1 It is a view about how we do talk when we so engage.It is the view that we do not use moral talk to represent or,
at least, not only to represent; we use moral talk to express affective
or conative attitudes. Moreover, this expression of affective or conative
attitudes is, in some sense, a primary function of moral talk. Thus con-
strued, expressivism is a hermeneutic as opposed to a revolutionary
theory.2
Hermeneutic expressivists must say that when we make moral as-
sertions, we thereby express affective or conative attitudes, and that
some sort of recognition of this tight connection between moral asser-
tion and expression of affective or conative attitudes is part of being
competent with moral language. In what follows, I give some reasons
to doubt this. I discuss a principle linking expression in the case of
non-moral assertion to expression in the case of moral assertion. I then
use this principle to formulate a prediction about the incoherence of a
moral analogue of Moore-paradoxical assertions. I argue that this pre-
diction is disconfirmed and that this disconfirmation makes it implau-
sible that recognition of the expression of affective or conative attitudes
is part of the competence conditions of moral assertion. Expressivist
views which employ a version of this principle are thus incorrect as a
hermeneutic account of moral talk.3
1. It is difficult to use some of the more natural vocabulary for thought and
judgment when discussing expressivist views since ‘thinking’ and ‘judging’
sound rather cognitive. I will occasionally use ‘judgment’ below, but I mean this
to be taken in as neutral a sense as possible, representing the sort of judgment
we might also make in matters aesthetic and other domains which might admit
of a non-cognitivist treatment.
2. See (Burgess 1983) for the distinction between hermeneutic and revolution-
ary theories.
3. The prediction extends outside of ethics to expressivist views about, say,
logic and epistemic modals. For some cases, such as epistemic modals, it seems
that expressivist accounts pass my formulated prediction with flying colors
(Yalcin 2007). For simplicity, I focus on moral discourse here. I hope to discuss
other forms of expressivism elsewhere.
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My argument leaves unscathed strongly revolutionary versions of
expressivism which concede that ordinary moral discourse is cognitive
and that moral assertions do not primarily function to express conative
or affective attitudes, but which demand of ordinary speakers that they
stop speaking in this way.4 Such views are beyond the scope of this
paper. I will show that hermeneutic expressivism is problematic, but
I cannot show that we cannot adopt linguistic contentions for directly
expressing certain of our conative and affective states of mind and
drop the rest of moral discourse entirely. We might be able to do this.
The important question for revolutionary expressivism is whether we
ought to do this.5 I suspect that there are no real advantages to an
expressivistic reform over the alternative of directly asserting our states
of mind using our existing linguistic resources for doing so, but this
debate should take place once a revolutionary expressivist view has
been formulated.6
Turning to the argument against hermeneutic expressivism, we
note that it is generally agreed that there is a tight connection between
4. Of course, hermeneutic expressivists have a choice in exactly how
hermeneutic they want to be. The correct account of the meaning of logical
expressions, for example, has to account for our actual use of logical expres-
sions. But slight deviance from ordinary usage is not that distressing. We can
reasonably give a mostly hermeneutic theory of logical vocabulary while still
not accommodating the distressing tendency of ordinary reasoners to not draw
conclusions by modus tollens (Wason 1960). We’re allowed to jettison small por-
tions of our ordinary talk when doing so gives a sensible overall account of
the linguistic practice we’re engaged in. Expressivists are entitled to adopt this
sort of perspective about their accounts of moral discourse. If expressivist views
are on the whole more satisfying than cognitivist views as an account of our
ordinary moral discourse, then it does not matter so much if some peripheral
aspects of ordinary moral discourse are abandoned. However, for expressivism
to have any plausibility as a hermeneutic theory, expressivists must be correct
that moral discourse is primarily a vehicle for expressing our conative and
affective attitudes.
5. And, of course, it is difficult to maintain that we ought to do so when this
‘ought’ is a moral ought. It would be even more difficult to express that we
ought to revise all normative discourse. These sorts of worries go beyond the
scope of this paper, but see (McCloskey 1969, pp. 155–157) for a nice discussion.
6. Such a view would also have to show how expressivistic reform is superior
to more traditional fictionalist and conventional alternatives.
sincere assertion and belief. One reason for this arises from cases of in-
coherent assertions first noticed by Moore. He observed that assertions
of the form ‘p, but I don’t believe that p’ are strikingly incoherent,
while assertions of the form ‘p, but she doesn’t believe that p’ are per-
fectly fine. The proper explanation of this is that when I assert p, I
somehow commit myself to believing that p, but not by asserting that
I believe that p.7 Because I have committed myself to believing that p,
when I go on to say ‘I don’t believe that p’, I have undercut my imme-
diate prior commitment and left my audience in a muddle as to what
I was up to in so asserting.8 So, when I sincerely assert p, I commit
myself to, though I do not assert, my belief that p. It is this feature
that gives rise to the incoherence of an utterance of the form ‘p, but
I don’t believe that p’. The incoherence is a result of my incurring a
commitment I explicitly deny I meet.
This connection is important for developing expressivist accounts
of moral discourse since if we analyze our assertion of ‘Murder is
wrong’ as giving voice to our disapproval of murder, we invite the
charge that expressivism is nothing more than a slicked-up version
of the subjectivist view that my assertion of ‘Murder is wrong’ is the
same as an assertion of ‘I disapprove of murder.’ The proper response
to this is that an assertion of ‘Murder is wrong’ is no more the same as
an assertion of ‘I disapprove of murder’ than an assertion of ‘Madison
is in Wisconsin’ is the same as an assertion of ‘I believe that Madison is
in Wisconsin’. Rather, just as the assertion of ‘Madison is in Wisconsin’
is an assertion of ‘Madison is in Wisconsin’ and expresses that I believe
that Madison is in Wisconsin, the former assertion is an assertion of
7. The murky bit of this explanation is how we get from asserting p to the com-
mitment to believing that p. Various stories can be told about this connection,
but the details of these do not matter for my purposes.
8. This resulting incoherence is similar to the incoherence that is produced
if I were to promise to do something, then immediately declare that I have
no intention of honoring my promise. A helpful reviewer suggests ‘logically
odd’ or ‘pragmatically self-contradictory’ are perhaps better descriptions of the
phenomenon. None of these three expressions are perfect, so I will continue to
follow tradition and use ‘incoherence’. No confusion should result.
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‘Murder is wrong’ and expresses that I disapprove of murder. Russell,
in his characteristically clear manner, articulates an early version of
this response thus:
The matter may perhaps become clearer by contrasting an
ethical sentence with one which makes a statement. If I say ‘all
Chinese are Buddhists,’ I can be refuted by the production of a
Chinese Christian or Mohammedan. If I say ‘I believe that all
Chinese are Buddhists,’ I cannot be refuted by any evidence
from China, but only by evidence that I do not believe what I
say; for what I am asserting is only something about my own
state of mind. If, now, a philosopher says ‘Beauty is good,’ I may
interpret him as meaning either ‘Would that everybody loved
the beautiful’ (which corresponds to ‘all Chinese are Buddhists’)
or ‘I wish that everybody loved the beautiful’ (which corre-
sponds to ‘I believe that all Chinese are Buddhists’). The first of
these makes no assertion, but expresses a wish; since it affirms
nothing, it is logically impossible that there should be evidence
for or against it, or for it to possess either truth or falsehood.
The second sentence, instead of being merely optative, does
make a statement, but it is one about the philosopher’s state of
mind, and it could only be refuted by evidence that he does not
have the wish that he says he has. This second sentence does
not belong to ethics, but to psychology or biography. The first
sentence, which does belong to ethics, expresses a desire for
something, but asserts nothing.
Ethics . . . contains no statements, whether true or false, but con-
sists of desires of a certain general kind, namely such as are con-
cerned with the desires of mankind in general — and of gods,
angels, and devils, if they exist. (Russell 1997, 237)
Instead of offering a distinct view of how we get from an assertion
of ‘Murder is wrong’ to disapproval of murder, the expressivist bor-
rows the relation that we already accept obtains between my sincere
assertion of ‘Madison is in Wisconsin’ and my belief that Madison is
in Wisconsin or, as Russell observes, between my sincere optative ut-
terance and my expression of a wish. Following (Schroeder 2008), we
will call this the “parity thesis”: Moral assertions express non-cognitive
attitudes like disapproval in exactly the same way that non-moral as-
sertions express cognitive attitudes like belief.9
The parity thesis follows naturally from a general picture of lan-
guage that often undergirds the expressivist account of moral dis-
course. On this picture, to understand what it is to assert that p, we
look at what we do by asserting that p. When p is an ordinary tables-
and-chairs proposition like ‘My red chair is at the oak table’, we de-
scribe and in so describing give voice to our way of representing
the world — our beliefs. When p is a moral proposition like ‘Mur-
der is wrong’, we do not—by expressivist lights—describe, but pre-
scribe, disapprove, and criticize, and in so prescribing, disapproving,
and criticizing, we give voice to our conative and affective states.10 So,
in both moral and non-moral cases, something we always do by sin-
cerely asserting is give voice to our possession of some mental state. It
is thus natural on this picture to see the expression relationship in the
ordinary-assertion-and-belief case as mirrored in the moral-assertion-
and-conative-state case. There are other ways to develop such lines of
thought, but all of them share the general feature that, however ex-
plained, it is a central part of the expressivist story that sincere moral
assertion expresses states like approval or disapproval in exactly the
same way as sincere non-moral assertion expresses belief.11
9. See (Gibbard 1992, p. 84), (Gibbard 2003, p. 64), and (Blackburn 1984, p.
169) for representative examples of this strategy.
10. The actual development of the expressivist view requires that we allow that
what appears to be part of the proposition asserted can have an effect on the
attitude expressed since the mere fact that we have sincerely asserted ‘Murder
is wrong’ or ‘Murder is right’ is not sufficient to nail down the precise attitude
expressed. It is only in conjunction with the bit appearing to the right of the
copula that we can see that the former expresses disapproval and the latter
approval. This issue gets murky very quickly and goes beyond the scope of
this paper, so I’m going to bracket it here.
11. A slight asymmetry between moral and non-moral assertion emerges here.
philosophers’ imprint - 3 - vol. 14, no. 5 (march 2014)
jack woods Expressivism and Moore’s Paradox
The fact that non-moral assertions express beliefs requires, on this
picture, that it is generally—if tacitly—recognized that asserting is
something that commits us to believing what we have asserted. This
is crucial if we are to explain how Moore-paradoxical assertions pro-
voke judgments of incoherence even in those who have no explicit
views about the connection between assertion and belief. This much
is relatively uncontroversial. What is more controversial, but nonethe-
less true, is that if the parity thesis is true, then there is a general—if
tacit—recognition of the fact that moral assertions express conative or
affective states. Of course, this is not a surprising commitment for an
expressivist. Consider Simon Blackburn on the point of making moral
assertions:
So what at last is said when we say that something is good or
right? Following Moore, we do not expect to identify the content
in other terms. We can now say, however, what is done when we
say such things. We avow a practical state. ‘Avowal’ here means
that we express this state, make it public, or communicate it. We
intend coordination with similar avowals or potential avowals
from others, and this is the point of the communication. When
this coordination is achieved, an intended direction is given to
our joint practical lives and choices. (Blackburn 1998, 68–69, em-
phasis mine)
Even without the parity thesis, it is difficult to imagine how this coor-
dination of expressions and avowals could proceed if the expressing
or avowing character of moral assertion were not at least tacitly recog-
nized by ordinary moralizers. Since expressivists like Blackburn hold
that expression of practical states is what we do with moral assertion
and that coordination of practical states is the point of moral discourse,
In both the moral and the non-moral case, what I assert is or at least appears
to be a proposition. The corresponding attitude for non-moral assertion is a
propositional attitude. This is not true of the moral case. Consider an assertion
of ‘Murder is wrong’. The expressed attitude of disapproval takes as its object
the action of murdering, not the proposition that murder is wrong.
they must hold that ordinary moralizers are in some position to rec-
ognize that moral assertions express practical states. If not, then there
remains no sense in which expressivism is a hermeneutic theory.12
The importance of the parity thesis for our purposes is that it allows
us to use features of the connection between assertion and belief to
test the putative connection between moral assertion and disapproval.
If, as the parity thesis has it, the relation of expression is the same
in the two cases, we ought to expect that well-known features of the
connection between assertion and belief reappear in the connection be-
tween moral assertion and disapproval. We have already discussed one
such feature above. It is a feature of the connection between assertion
and belief that Moore-paradoxical assertions are incoherent. Given the
above explanation of the incoherence of Moore-paradoxical utterances
and that expressivism is a hermeneutic theory, we can use the par-
ity thesis to formulate a prediction about moral assertions. If, as the
parity thesis has it, moral assertions express non-cognitive attitudes
like disapproval in exactly the same way that non-moral assertions ex-
press cognitive attitudes like belief and if, as the correct explanation of
Moore’s paradox has it, it is the expression relation that gives rise to
cases of Moore’s paradox, we should expect moral versions of Moore’s
paradox. The presence of such cases increases the plausibility of the
expressivist’s story; the lack of such decreases its plausibility. In what
follows, I show that we do not find moral versions of Moore’s paradox
where we would expect, given the expressivist story about expression.
We have noted that non-moral assertions like ‘Grass is green, but I
don’t believe it’ are incoherent.13 We’re interested in seeing if the analo-
gous constructions with moral content display analogous incoherence.
Before considering this directly, we will work through a few warm-up
cases. First, consider the conventionalized locutions for expressing pro
12. See objection 7 below for more on the sense of recognition I have in mind.
13. Note also that constructions like ‘I believe grass is green, but it ain’t’ are
likewise incoherent. Theorists call the second construction “commissive” as
opposed to “omissive” versions of Moore’s paradox. I focus on the omissive
versions of Moore’s paradox in this paper. Nothing turns on this.
philosophers’ imprint - 4 - vol. 14, no. 5 (march 2014)
jack woods Expressivism and Moore’s Paradox
or con attitudes at sporting events. We say ‘Go Red Sox!’ or ‘Boo Yan-
kees!’ I haven’t asserted anything when I utter ‘Go Red Sox!’, but I
have surely given voice to my support of the Red Sox in some fashion.
So, let’s consider:
(1) Go Red Sox! I don’t support the Red Sox.
This seems incoherent. Likewise, consider:
(2) Boo Yankees! I don’t have any negative attitude towards the
Yankees.
or, better:
(3) Fuck the Yankees! I have no negative attitude towards the
Yankees.
(4) Yankees suck! I have no negative attitude towards the Yan-
kees.
Likewise incoherent.14 These examples indicate that we can reproduce
cases of the incoherence present in the standard Moore-paradoxical
constructions without using sentences in the indicative. Ejaculations
like ‘Go Red Sox!’ are not usually considered assertions, but they give
rise to the same incoherence when paired with a denial of possessing
the relevant backing attitude of approval. Sincere utterance of ‘Go Red
Sox!’ thus plausibly requires the possession of some degree of enthu-
siasm and approval for the team. We can also use such expressions to
voice our attitudes towards certain courses of action:
(5) Yay for drinking a lot of beer tonight! I don’t approve of
drinking a lot of beer tonight.
Just as sincere utterance of ‘Go Red Sox!’ requires that I, in some sense,
14. Of course, to work, these expressions have to be uttered with a certain
amount of oomph. Note that the second sentence in each example indicates the
attitudes directly without the emphatic language. This is important because in
(7–10) below, the word ‘wrong’ does not appear after the conjunction.
approve of the Red Sox, sincere utterance of ‘Yay for drinking a lot of
beer tonight’ requires that I approve of that plan of action. Likewise
for other non-assertoric utterances. Consider Russell’s case from above
conjoined with a denial of the wish expressed:
(6) Would that everyone loved the beautiful, but I don’t wish
that everyone loved the beautiful.
Incoherent. Now, let’s consider our target case:
(7) Murder is wrong, but I don’t disapprove of it.
This does not reproduce the same sort of incoherence at all. Likewise
with:
(8) Murder is wrong, but I’m not against it.
(9) Murder is wrong, but I’m in favor of doing it.
(10) Murder is wrong, but I like doing it, and I don’t feel
bad about it.
Though we wouldn’t trust the utterer of (7–10) to watch our children,
we do not find their utterances defective in the way we find (1–6) and
standard cases of Moore’s paradox defective. We know what the ut-
terer of (7–10) is saying; we just do not approve of it.15 Note, as a bit
of contrast, how strongly incoherent the following is:
(11) Murder is wrong, but I don’t believe it is wrong.16
15. I do not mean to claim that any of the above, including standard cases
of Moore’s paradox, cannot be situated in examples that make sense of them.
Of course they can. But such cases require significant aberration before they
become coherent. Galileo’s “Eppur si muove” didn’t produce incoherence only
because we know that his recantation was forced. Likewise, if we know that
we’re under the influence of some drug, we might say, in wonderment, “The
walls are closing in. Of course, I don’t (really) believe that they are”, but here
we’re recording how the world seems to us and then slightly backing off our
commitment to it being that way in awareness of the influence of the drug.
16. Richard Joyce notes the incoherence of (11) in (Joyce 2009), but does not
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Have I clinched my case that we do not find Moore-paradoxical
moral assertions? Not exactly. I have only explored one type of moral
utterance and that involving only a single moral term. I have also only
canvassed the most straightforward attitudes to insert on the right-
hand side of the conjunction. However, it is easy to see from my ex-
amples how to construct similar cases with other, less central, moral
vocabulary and with other, less plausible, accounts of the conative
or affective attitude expressed by moral assertions. The cases I have
checked also fail to display the incoherence we might reasonably ex-
pect. We can formulate the problem for hermeneutic expressivism as
the following three jointly-inconsistent claims:
(C1) Moral assertions express non-cognitive mental states in exactly
the same way that non-moral assertions express beliefs.
(C2) When an assertion expresses that the utterer is in a mental state
p, then (contrastively) conjoining this assertion with the denial of
being in p yields a certain kind of infelicitous utterance.
(C3) Moral assertions conjoined with the denial of being in the men-
tal state expressed by such utterances by expressivist lights aren’t
infelicitous in this way.
We will not fuss about (C2) here since it is a generalized account of
the explanation of Moore’s paradox for non-moral assertion. Nothing
about that explanation requires that the assertion be non-moral. All
that is required is that in asserting p we commit ourselves to having
draw the same lesson I do. He instead claims that an example like (7–10) above
is Moore-paradoxical. However, he uses as the attitude expressed Gibbard’s
notion of subscription to a normative standard which rules it (murder) out,
which is difficult to distinguish in the vernacular from ‘believing that murder
is wrong’. I thus do not think that the putative incoherence of ‘Murder is wrong,
but I do not subscribe to a normative standard which rules it out’ would be a
problem for my argument even if it does sound incoherent. When it seems inco-
herent, it may be being understood cognitively. See also objection and response
6 below.
some particular attitude towards p. The reasonable options for avoid-
ing this problem are thus to reject the parity thesis (C1) or to reject the
data (C3). I think the right thing to do is to reject (C1). If the expres-
sivist does this, they’re absent the standard response to the charge that
expressivism is subjectivism nattily attired. They would now need to
give some sort of plausible story about the relation between moral as-
sertion and the non-cognitive attitude expressed that also explains the
above data without retreating to subjectivism. Most stories that have
so far been told are vulnerable to my objection.17 I thus think rejecting
(C1) makes serious, perhaps deadly, worries for expressivism as a
hermeneutic program. I will thus ignore it as an option for the expres-
sivist. So my focus in the rest of the paper will be on objections to (C3).
Objection 1: Many expressivists and some cognitivists find the
examples above to have a whiff of paradox.
Response: This is really grist for my mill. Just about everyone
finds Moore-paradoxical assertions strongly incoherent. This is why it
is so plausible that sincere assertions express beliefs. That a few folks
find my examples slightly paradoxical shows that the incoherence,
if there is any, of (7–10), is at best different from the incoherence
of typical Moore-paradoxical assertions. But, absent an explanation
of why this is, and given the parity thesis, the incoherence should
be the same. Moreover, there are very plausible ways to explain
this whiff of paradox. Theorists should not deny that sincere moral
assertions are often accompanied by conative or affective attitudes.
Since we often use moral language to prescribe, disapprove, and
criticize, it is not surprising that a seemingly sincere assertion of this
type suggests that we possess various conative states. The connection
between sincere moral assertion and possession of various conative
17. See (Schroeder 2008) for an exploration of these stories and independent
arguments against most. On Schroeder’s favored approach possession of non-
cognitive attitudes play the role of sincerity conditions on moral assertions. His
approach is vulnerable to the above objection.
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or affective states would then be something like a reasonably strong
conversational implicature.18 Most people who make such assertions
have the relevant conative or affective states, but this does not mean
that these assertions express these conative or affective states in the
sense in which sincere non-moral assertions express beliefs.19
An anonymous reviewer helpfully worries that though everyone
in the debate can accept that ‘Murder is wrong’ expresses the belief
that murder is wrong in some minimalist sense of belief, nevertheless
it might be an informative and surprising fact that sometimes beliefs
are really conative states like desires. If so, the coherence of (7–10)
for non-expressivists might be explained by the fact that they are not
aware of the fact that moral assertions express conative or affective
states. Unfortunately, this suggestion is in tension with what the
hermeneutic expressivist claims—that the primary function of moral
assertions is to express conative or affective states.20 It is unclear to me
how the expressivist could maintain that our moral assertions express
conative or affective states and that the purpose of such expression is
coordination of these states while denying that ordinary moralizers are
18. Note that it cannot be something analogous to a conventional implicature
since (7–10) are coherent in the way that ‘Scrooge is rich, but he cares about
the impoverished. I don’t mean to imply that there’s any contrast between be-
ing rich and and caring about the impoverished’ is not. See (Finlay 2005) for
a development and defense of a conversational-implicature account of the con-
nection between moral assertion and possession of conative or affective states.
19. An anonymous reviewer worries that my point here conflicts with Mark
Schroeder’s hypotheticalism about reasons (Schroeder 2007). This is simply
a mistake. Hypotheticalism and like views hold that facts about reasons are
explained by our desires. They do not have to—and should not—hold that as-
sertions such as ‘I have decisive reason not to murder’ mean or express that we
have certain desires. The fact that getting struck by lightning is typically dam-
aging is explained by the fact that lightning is electrical discharge and various
physiological facts about typical human beings. However, it would be madness
to hold that ‘Getting struck by lightning is typically damaging, but lightning
is not electrical discharge’ is incoherent. Of course, views which do hold that
claims about reasons express desires must face my objection head-on.
20. See objection 6 below for more on the claim that there is a minimalist sense
of ‘belief’ in which moral assertions express beliefs, and objection 7 for discus-
sion of whether or not our beliefs about what is expressed by moral assertions
should matter for my examples.
able to recognize that their moral “beliefs” function differently than
ordinary beliefs. Minimalists about moral beliefs have typically gone
to great lengths to argue that we are, in fact, capable of recognizing
the distinction between moral and non-moral beliefs. If it is merely
those with a research interest in expressivism who find examples like
(7–10) problematic, then it seems to me that the burden is clearly on
the expressivist to explain how we ordinary moralizers can be taken
to be engaging in a public practice of communicating our affective or
conative states, that the purpose of such a practice is coordination, but
that this practice cannot be indicated to an ordinary moralizer by the
use of quite general expressions for what is expressed, such as ‘being
against’, ‘disapprove’, and ‘being in favor’.21 Note also that in cases
such as (1-6) we were able to produce incoherence by describing the
state not possessed in similarly general language. It would be a sur-
prising fact demanding explanation if hermeneutic expressivism were
true but we couldn’t elicit similar judgments of incoherence in this way.
Objection 2: The relative felicity of the examples above is due to an
inverted-commas use of ‘wrong’. When so used, ‘Murder is wrong’
means something like ‘Murder is wrong (by the moral standards of
the prevailing society)’.
Response: This suggestion is implausible for many reasons. The
most obvious reason is that such an aberrant interpretation of the
meaning of ‘Murder is wrong’ is implausible without conditions
suggesting such an interpretation. Our examples have no such
accompanying conditions. Of course, the objector might think that it
is the mere availability of an inverted-commas reading that renders
21. This objection and response raises the specter of the moral-attitudes prob-
lem for expressivism (Sturgeon 1986). Since this is a further objection to the
hermeneutic expressivist program, I will not discuss it here other than to note
that the more difficult it is to recognize the relevant conative and affective atti-
tudes, the more implausible it is that we can be taken to be engaged in a public
practice of coordination of such attitudes.
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the examples coherent. However, this would be a mistake. Inverted
comma readings are often indicated by stress, but the above examples
do not require stress to be felicitous. Further, the mere existence of
an inverted comma reading of a sentence is not sufficient for the
coherence of such examples. Predicates of personal taste, for example,
clearly have an inverted-commas reading, but ‘Broccoli is delicious,
but I don’t like it’ is still strikingly incoherent without some indication
that such a reading is intended. So inverted-commas readings aren’t
sufficient to defuse the incoherence of similar Moore-paradoxical
utterances. Finally, if the mere availability of an inverted commas
reading sufficed, then standard cases of Moore’s paradox would
sound coherent. But they do not.
Objection 3: The felicity of such examples is due to our perception of
the utterers as slightly irrational; they violate a condition of rationality
that requires that we are somewhat motivated by our moral judgments.
Response: Judgment internalism—the view that sincere judgment
that something is wrong motivates us insofar as we are rational—is
common in metaethics, especially among expressivists.22 However,
though it may be true that we see sincere utterers of (7–10) as at least
slightly irrational, this is irrelevant to the argument. If the agent is
perceived as being weak-willed or irrational and makes the moral
assertion ‘Murder is wrong’, we take them to likely be unmotivated by
the attitude they typically possess, not to fail to possess the relevant
attitude. If, as the expressivists have it, moral assertion is to be un-
derstood in terms of the expression of a conative or affective attitude,
then we must hold that even the irrational or weak-willed agent who
asserts a moral proposition expresses that attitude. Actually, this helps
to explain the “whiff” of paradox some feel when confronted with
22. Note that the strong version of judgment internalism—that judging some-
thing is wrong motivates, regardless of whether or not we are rational—is di-
rectly threatened by my argument. So much the worse for strong judgment
internalism.
the examples. If judgment internalism is true, someone who sincerely
uttered (7–10) would be irrational. And it is odd to be confronted with
someone so flagrantly displaying their irrationality. So the examples
are strange for that reason, but they are not strange in the same way
that (11) is. The seemingly sincere utterer of (11) displays linguistic
incompetence rather than mere irrationality.
This objection also seems to get a typical motivation for judg-
ment internalism back to front. One standard reason for accepting
expressivism involves believing that there is some reliable connection
between moral judgment and motivation. If the primary function
of our use of moral terminology is to express such attitudes, then
the seeming fact that our moral judgments often co-travel with
inclination is to be expected. Expressivists like Gibbard hold that the
best explanation of judgment internalism is that moral assertions
express conative or affective attitudes and these attitudes are directly
tied into our motivational systems. However, we can’t then explain
away the coherence of the above examples by appeal to judgment
internalism since this was to be explained by the putative incoherence
of holding that murder is wrong without disapproving of it. In any
case, judgment internalism cuts across the cognitivist/non-cognitivist
divide.23
Objection 4: The felicity of such examples is due to our not expressing
a first-order conative or affective state. Sometimes our moral judg-
ments express higher-order conative or affective states.
Response: A moment’s consideration reveals the reason this does not
work. There’s nothing incoherent about ‘Murder is wrong, but I don’t
disapprove of it, and I don’t disapprove of my failure to disapprove of
it.’
23. See (Smith 1994) for a cognitivist account of moral discourse on which the
judgment-internalist thesis is true.
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Objection 5: We could distinguish between cold and impersonal
moral judgments issued in the course of theorizing and heated moral
judgments issued in the course of criticizing others’ actions or guiding
our own. We could then say that it is only in the former sort of case
where the examples above are felicitous. In heated contexts, such
utterances are straightforwardly bizarre.
Response: This is not really a rejection of (C3), but a rejection of
(C1), since it admits that it is not always the case that affective or
conative attitudes are expressed by moral assertions. If non-cognitive
mental states are only sometimes expressed by moral assertions,
then the claim that what we’re really up to with our moral talk is
expressing our attitudes towards various actions, persons, and such
has to be seriously tempered. In addition, we need an explanation
of when such attitudes are expressed and when they are not. It is
implausible to think that such an explanation will not go by way
of some account of the meaning of moral terms like ‘wrong’. For
example, my disapproving of murder might be conveyed as a type of
implicature of my assertion that ‘Murder is wrong’. This strikes me
as the correct account of how asserting that murder is wrong triggers
the reasonable expectation that I disapprove of murder. Since uses of
terms like ‘wrong’ do not always yield expression of various affective
or conative attitudes, it is unlikely that such attitudes will play a
serious role in the account of their meaning.
Objection 6: There are two sorts of beliefs: small-b beliefs which
are the mental correlate of all assertions and big-B Beliefs which
are representational states with mind-to-world direction of fit. Our
assertions express beliefs, but on this view, some beliefs are actually
conative or affective states.24
24. Thanks to Hannah Altehenger and Tristram McPherson for pushing me to
address this point.
Response: Minimalism about belief is a popular commitment of
many contemporary expressivists—especially those also claiming
quasi-realism.25 But, even if we grant this point, all this shows is
that the incoherence of (11) does not give us reason to accept Cogni-
tivism, but only cognitivism, where the latter is the view that moral
judgments are small-b beliefs. It also doesn’t show that my examples
should be coherent; far from it. Gibbard, Blackburn, and even the
cognitive expressivists Horgan and Timmons accept that there is a
sense in which we can divide up minimal beliefs into, say, “ordinary”
beliefs and “normative” beliefs. Since expressivism requires that we
be able to publicly communicate the normative beliefs we express
by making moral assertions, there has to be a way that we recognize
this attitude other than in its role as a special type of small-b belief.26
Given this, we should expect that when we plug in other names of the
attitude — say, ‘disapproval’ — we get incoherence. But we do not.
We may worry whether we have a name for this subclass of small-b
beliefs, but if the expression of these beliefs really is the central part of
the story of moral assertion, we would expect there to be a common
name for this sort of state. And, for every extant plausible expressivist
story, there is.
Objection 7: People fail to judge examples like (7–10) as infelicitous
because they do not know that expressivism is the correct account of
25. See (Gibbard 2003), (Blackburn 1984), and especially (Horgan and Timmons
2006a) for discussion. Each distinguishes a natural subclass of beliefs expressed
by moral assertions like Gibbard’s plan-laden beliefs. See (Dreier 2004) for the
plausible claim that rampant minimalism threatens to undermine the distinc-
tiveness of the expressivist program and (Dunaway 2010) for serious worries
about whether minimalism is a coherent addition to the expressivist program.
26. Note that we also cannot simply analyze a non-cognitive attitude like dis-
approval of φ-ing in terms of the believing that φ-ing is wrong and then go
on to say that what it is to have a normative belief is to possess an attitude of
disapproval. This would be flatly circular. Any expressivist view worthy of the
name needs to hold that states like disapproval are specifiable independently
of the notion of belief. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this
point.
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our moral discourse.27
Response: This is a surprisingly common objection. While it is
true that the relation between belief and non-moral assertion is more
widely acknowledged than the purported relation between moral
assertion and attitudes like disapproval, it is not at all clear why
this should matter. Judgments of felicity and infelicity of various
utterances are supposed to reveal underlying facts about our linguistic
competence. We take ordinary speakers’ judgments about what is
communicated to be informative about what is pragmatically impli-
cated by various utterances even though they are largely unaware
of the mechanisms by which pragmatic implication works. Explicit
knowledge-that of how various linguistic mechanisms like assertion
work is simply not needed for competent usage.
In any case, if some modicum of knowledge were required, it is
not clear that ordinary people lack it. Ordinary people are as aware
that moral assertions are commonly used to condemn and give vent
to attitudes as they are that non-moral assertions about mid-sized
dry goods are used to describe and represent. However, they get the
infelicity with the ordinary cases of Moore’s paradox and fail to get it
with cases like (7–10). If the connection between asserting ‘Murder is
wrong’ and giving vent to an attitude of disapproval were the same
as the connection between asserting ‘Weebles wobble’ and expressing
belief in the wobbling of Weebles, we would expect no such disparity
in the reactions. Yet we find disparity. Committed expressivists (in-
cluding a former version of myself) also have disparate reactions, but
they surely believe that moral assertions express various non-cognitive
attitudes like disapproval. This is difficult to explain if the parity
thesis is true since there is no such disparity in the case of belief and
assertion.
27. Thanks to Barry Maguire and Cory Nichols for convincing me to take this
objection seriously.
Objection 8: There’s a single attitude (belief) expressed by non-moral
assertion, but a diffuse set of attitudes expressed by a moral assertion
(disapproval, moralized disgust, regret, etc). (7–10) are not incoherent
because we’re able to find readings where the attitude expressed is
not the same as the attitude denied.
Response: Most of the cases given above used very generic lan-
guage for the attitudes involved. If we run the ordinary version of
Moore’s paradox with an expression for a more generic attitude
(say, ‘think’) we continue to get incoherence. Since disapproval and
being against encompass a number of possible negative affective
and conative attitudes just like thinking encompasses a number of
cognitive attitudes, we should expect incoherence with ‘disapprove’
and ‘being against’ just like we find incoherence with ‘think’. We
do not find such incoherence. This objection also conflicts with a
desideratum of a successful expressivist account of moral discourse.
A successful expressivist account should give a compositional account
of the attitudes expressed by moral assertions. The more diverse the
attitudes expressed by moral assertions, the weaker the prospects for
a straightforward compositional account of the attitudes expressed.
Objection 9: Hybrid expressivist views can explain the coherence of
the above examples by allowing that the cognitive state expressed
is not undercut when we deny possessing the relevant conative or
affective attitude.
Response: The plausibility of this objection depends on the type
of hybrid expressivism under consideration. If the correctness con-
ditions of moral assertion in any way depend on the expression
of some other conative or affective attitude, then the coherence of
the above examples is problematic. If they do not, then it is hard
to see how these theories are truly expressivist accounts since it
is not part of the competence conditions of moral assertion that it
expresses conative or affective attitudes. Moreover, we cannot coher-
ently undercut the cognitive state expressed, leaving the conative or
philosophers’ imprint - 10 - vol. 14, no. 5 (march 2014)
jack woods Expressivism and Moore’s Paradox
affective untouched. Cognitivist accounts, of course, can and plausibly
should accommodate the fact that moral assertions often give strong
evidence that the asserter possesses some conative or affective attitude.
I have argued that the parity thesis generates the prediction that
moral assertions like ‘Murder is wrong, but I don’t disapprove of
it’ are incoherent. I then argued that such examples are not incoherent,
whereas assertions like ‘Murder is wrong, but I don’t believe murder
is wrong’ are incoherent. There are two lessons here: one major, one
minor. The minor one was briefly mentioned above, but it is worth
noting again. The incoherence of (11) coupled with the above explana-
tion of Moore-paradoxicality shows that expression of belief needs to
be involved in some way in an account of moral assertion.28 The ma-
jor lesson is that the expressivist cannot simply borrow the expression
relation as it holds between assertion and belief to explain the expres-
sion relation as it holds (if it does) between non-cognitive attitudes like
disapproval and moral assertion. Since assertions like (7–10) are not in-
coherent, expressivists have to reject the parity thesis (C1) and provide
an independent account of the relation between sincere assertions like
‘Murder is wrong’ and whatever non-cognitive attitude they believe
is expressed thereby without routing through a realist account of the
meaning of moral terms like ‘wrong’. Given the ubiquity of the parity
thesis in expressivist accounts, it seems unlikely that such an account
will be forthcoming. And if there is no such account, hermeneutic ex-
pressivism is simply incorrect.29
28. This lesson is minor only in the context of this paper—that is, in the context
of an argument that hermeneutic expressivist views which employ a version of
the parity thesis are incorrect. As a lesson for any hermeneutic view of moral
assertion, it is quite important. It shows that belief, in some sense, needs to be
accounted for by a theory of moral assertion. Of course, a minimalist account
of belief would be sufficient for this purpose.
29. Thanks are due to Hannah Altehenger, Paul Benacerraf, John Burgess,
Shane Gronholz, Errol Lord, Barry Maguire, Corey Maley, Jimmy Martin, Tris-
tram McPherson, Angela Mendelovici, Cory Nichols, Giulia Pravato, Peter Rail-
ton, Michael Smith, a couple of very helpful referees, and audiences at the
Princeton Workshop in Normative Philosophy, the Rocky Mountain Philoso-
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